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I. ARGUMENT 
A. APPELLANTS HAVE LEGITIMATELY CHALLENGED KEY FINDINGS AS 
BEING BASED ON INCORRECT LEGAL STANDARDS AND, CONTRARY TO 
RESPONDENT'S ASSERTION, HA VE NOT ASKED THE COURT TO "REWEIGH THE 
EVIDENCE AND SECOND GUESS THE COMMISSIONS' FACTUAL FINDINGS" 
Claimant's principal attack on Employer's and Surety's argument is his allegation that the 
Defendants have "fail[ed] to raise any legal errors by the Industrial Commission" and that 
"Employer simply invites the Court to reweigh the evidence and second guess the Commission's 
factual findings." Respondent's Brief, pp. 9-14. That is an incorrect characterization of 
Employer's and Surety's position. The five issues on appeal raised by Employer and Surety are 
predicated on the standard of review that whether the Commission applied the correct legal 
standard to its determinations of factual issues is a question of law. Combes v. State, Industrial 
Special Indemnity Fund, 130 Idaho 430, 432, 942 P.2d 554, 556 (1997). Moreover, where 
questions of law are present, the Court exercises free review. Izaquirre v. R & L Carriers Shared 
Services, LLC, 155 Idaho 229,231,308 P.3d 929,931 (2013). 
The Commission analyzed the evidence in the case based on its reading of Matter of 
Barker, 110 Idaho 871,710 P.2d 1131 ( 1986), which it determined "is controlling and dispositive." 
Finding 28, R., p.26. Employer and Surety have contended that the Commission incorrectly 
applied the legal principles contained in Matter of Barker and the predecessor appeal in Barker v. 
Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 105 Idaho 108,666 P. 23 635 (1983) (Barker I). These cases dealt with 
travel expense payments as an exception to the going and coming rule. The Court in Barker I held 
that payment by an employer of a travel allowance to an employee is legally insufficient by itself 
to establish an exception to the going and coming rule~ there must be other evidence to establish 
that the employer intended to compensate the employee for travel time. And in Matter of Barker 
the Court affirmed the Commission's determination on remand that there was no evidence other 
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than travel allowance payments .. to indicate that the employer intended to compensate the 
employee for travel time or travel expense." Matter of Barker, 110 Idaho at 872, 719 P.2d at 1132. 
The Commission reached the Conclusion of Law that Claimant had proven that his accident 
"arose out of and in the course of his employment with 2M." Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, Order and Dissenting Opinion, Conclusion of Law l, R., p. 30. It predicated that conclusion 
of law on Findings 24, 25, 26, and 27. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Dissenting 
Opinion, R., pp. 25-6. In Finding 24, it stated that an inference that Employer intended to 
compensate Claimant for travel time was supported by the provision of a company vehicle and 
payment of expenses associated with its use, Claimant's status as a 24-7 "on-call employee, and 
the benefit to the employer from the arrangement. R., p. 25. In Finding 25, it inferred that Claimant 
was a 24/7 "on-call" employee because he might have to go out on a service call at any time of 
day. R., p. 25. And in Finding 26 it concluded that that Employer's interests were served "by 
ensuring that Claimant will always have the means available to immediately respond to emergency 
calls." R. p. 25-6. In Finding 27, it then stated that the foregoing three findings were "sufficient 
to bring Claimant's accident within the course of employment." R., p. 26. 
In view of Matter of Barker, the specific issue before the Commission in the instant case 
was whether there was evidence apart from the use of a company pickup and the payment of fuel 
and maintenance expenses of the pickup to establish that Employer intended to compensate 
Claimant for his travel time. Employer and Surety contend that none of the Commission's findings 
in Findings 24 through 27 involve the payment of travel time. Nor do those findings, as a matter 
of law, support an inference that "Employer intended to compensate Claimant for travel time[.]" 
Under Idaho law, an inference is illegitimate if it permits the trier of fact to base its determination 
"on mere speculation and conjecture." Owen v. Burcham, 100 Idaho 441, 448, 599 P.2d 1012, 
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IO 19 (1979). And an inference is illegitimate where there is no evidence in the record on the 
specific point at issue." Thomas v. Arkaosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352,358, 48 P.3d 1241, 1247 
(2002). 
Besides the illegitimacy of the Commission's inference regarding intent to pay for travel 
time, the Commission also erred as a matter of law by applying incorrect legal standards to the 
significance of Claimant's status as an "on call" employee. The Court previously has reversed the 
Commission in a going and coming case when it determined that the Commission incorrectly 
applied standards applicable to one type of exception to the going and coming rule in a case more 
correctly falling under another exception. See Ridgeway v. Combined bzsurance Companies of 
America, 98 Idaho 410, 565 P.2d 1367 ( 1977 ). 
Ridgway involved application of the traveling employee exception to the going and coming 
rule. Ridgway was on assignment by his employer in Salt Lake City to attend a two-week training 
program. He was injured in an auto accident while traveling with a co-employee in the co-
employee's care to pick up hamburgers for lunch for the other participants at the training. 
Ridgeway brought a workers' compensation claim. The Industrial Commission analyzed his claim 
under the special or peculiar risk exception and denied the claim because it concluded that 
Ridgeway had not established a sufficient causal relationship between his employment and the 
accident "on which to base a conclusion that the accident arose out of an in the course of 
employment with the defendant." 98 Idaho at 411, 565 P.2d at 1368. Ridgeway appealed, and the 
Court reversed. The Court reversed because it determined that the Commission applied the wrong 
legal standard. Rather than applying the special or peculiar risk exception, the Court held that the 
Commission should have analyzed the evidence under the traveling employee exception. 
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The appropriate rule to be applied to determine the scope of workmen's 
compensation coverage for employees whose work entails travel away from the 
employer's premises at which the employee normally works is set forth in 1 Larsen, 
Worker's Compensation Law,§ 25.00, p. 443: 
"Employees whose work entails travel away from the employer's premises are held 
in the majority of jurisdictions are held in the majority of jurisdictions to be within 
the course of their employment continuously during the trip, except when a distinct 
departure on a personal errand is shown. Thus, injuries arising out of the necessity 
of sleeping in hotels or eating in restaurants away from home are usually held 
compensable." 
98 Idaho at 411 -2, 565 P.2d at 1368-69. 
In the instant case, The Commission imported into the determination of the intent to pay 
for travel time analytical features more properly related to issues under the special errand exception 
to the going and coming rule. Claimant's "on-call" status to respond to customer needs outside 
normal working hours would have been relevant under the special errand rule had Claimant's 
accident occurred while he was traveling from his home to attend to a customer, or on his way 
home after attending to a customer; it is not relevant to whether Employer intended to compensate 
Claimant for travel time. The special errand exception involves injuries occurring while an 
employer going to perform, performing, or returning from performing "some special service or 
errand or the discharge of some duty incidental to the nature of his employment in the interest of, 
or under the direction of, his employer." Pitkin v. Westem Construction, 112 Idaho 506, 508, 733 
P.2d 727, 729 (1987). "The special errand exception is premised on the idea that an employee 
leaving his normal place of work to perform a special job for an employer is, nevertheless, still 
performing part of his normal job." Finlwld v. Creso, 143 Idaho 894, 898, 155 P.3d 695, 699 
(2007). 
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Because the Commission committed errors of law in making its factual determinations 
regarding the course of employment issue, the substantial competence standard of review, contrary 
to Claimant's assertion, is not relevant in the case. 
B. THE COMMISSION COMMITTED ERROR BY FAILING TO MAKE A 
SPECIFIC FACTUAL FINDING IN THE ISSUE OF WHETHER CLAIMANT'S 
ACCIDENT AROSE OUT OF EMPLOYMENT 
Employer and Surety also contend that the Commission erred as a matter of law by failing 
to make a finding of fact as to whether or not Claimant's accident arose out of employment. The 
Commission drew a Conclusion of Law that Claimant's "accident arose out of and in the course 
of employment." The Commission, however, only made a finding the Claimant's accident was 
within the course of employment; it did not make a finding as to whether the accident arose out of 
the employment. The Court recognizes that cases involving the going and coming rule and its 
exceptions require proof that an accident both arose out of employment and occurred in the course 
of employment. Dinius v. Loving Care and More, Inc., 133 Idaho 572,990 P.2d 738 (1999). 
The Court noted in Dinius that "[t]he words 'out or have been held to refer to the origin 
and cause of the accident and the words 'in the course or refer to the time, place, and circumstance 
under which the accident occurred." 133 Idaho at 574, 990 P.2d at 740. "An injury is deemed in 
the course of employment when a causal connection is found to exists between the circumstances 
under which the work must be performed and the injury of which the claimant complains." Id. 
Employer and surety contend that that the arising out of employment requirement requires 
in the context of a case such as this that the employee must be involved in some service for the 
employer at the time of the accident. Claimant was commuting from his home to work at the 
Employer's office when the accident happened. He was not on his way to a customer's place of 
business, nor was he returning from a customer's place of business to either the Employer's office 
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or his home. Without a service-connected requirement, the fact that an employer derives a benefit 
from his employee being at work during normal business hours or available to respond to service 
calls outside normal business hours and that the employee has the use of a company vehicle 
essentially would scuttle the going and coming rule. Linkage between service and accident is 
consistent with the general definition in Dinius v. Loving Care and More, Inc., supra, that an 
"injury is considered to arise out of employment when a causal connection is found to exist 
between the circumstances under which the work must be performed and the injury of which the 
claimant complains." 133 Idaho at 574-575, 99 P.2d at 740-741. 
C. CONTRARY TO RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION, THE COMI\fiSSION DID 
NOT COMMIT ERROR BY FAILING TO APPLY THE MANION AND HANSEN 
DECISIONS 
Claimant argues in Part III. E. of Respondent's Brief, pp. 19-25, that should the Court 
decline to affirm the Industrial Commission, the Court, should, rather than ordering reversal, 
remand the case to the Commission with directions to find for Claimant. Claimant contends that 
would be the correct result based upon the Court's holdings in either Manion v. Waybright, 59 
Idaho 643, 86 P.2d 181 (1938), or Hansen v. Estate of Harvey, 119 Idaho 333,806 P.2d 426 (1991). 
He asserts "that the Commission erred by failing to apply the principles of either of those cases." 
Respondent's Brief, p. 19. Claimant essentially argues that Manion and Hansen stand for the 
proposition that when an accident occurs while an employee is occupying a vehicle provided by 
his/her employer, the use of the vehicle is legally sufficient by itself to remove the accident from 
the going and coming rule. Appellants' contend that Respondent's argument is not supported by 
the context of the Manion and Hansen cases and by a close reading of the facts in each decision. 
Manion was a negligence action, not a workers' compensation case. The plaintiff was 
Manion's widow. Manion was a passenger in a vehicle operated by Watson, who was a friend of 
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Manion's. Watson was on employ of Waybright, who was a wholesale merchant of fruits and 
vegetables with headquarters in Spokane, Washington. Waybright distributed produce in the 
Spokane area and in northern Idaho. Watson was employed by Waybright as a traveling salesman. 
Watson's territory included Coeur d'Alene, St. Maries, Kellog, Wallace and intervening points in 
Idaho. Watson lived in Coeur d'Alene. When his day's work was done, he generally returned to 
his home in Coeur d'Alene; however, when his employment duties occasionally required him to 
be in Spokane early in the morning, he would drive to Spokane and spend the night there. 
Waybright furnished Watson with a delivery automobile to use in performing his employment 
duties. 
Manion was not an employee of Waybright. Manion lived in Spokane where he was 
employed. Manion, however, wanted to look for higher paying work in the Coeur d'Alene mining 
district. Manion spoke with Watson about his job search desire, and he and Watson agreed that 
Manion would go with Watson on one of Watson's business trips to the mining district. On the 
morning of March 17, 1937, Manion caught a ride from Spokane to Coeur d'Alene with Watson's 
brother. Manion then road with Watson in Watson's delivery automobile from Coeur d'Alene to 
Kellog. The two men split up after they reached the mining district. Watson met up with Manion 
at about 9:30 p.m. on March 17•h after Watson had finished with his last customer in the mining 
district. Since Watson had to be at Waybright's place of business in Spokane at about 6:00 a.m. 
on March 181h, Watson planned to drive to Spokane the night of March 17•h and spend the night 
there, which would also allow him to drop Manion off at Manion 's home in Spokane. Watson had 
to be in Spokane early on March 181h to supervise and assist in the loading of the delivery 
automobile with vegetables. When Watson was about six or seven miles west of Coeur d' Alene 
and driving about 50 miles per hour, he failed to negotiate a slight curve and drove off the 
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pavement into a ditch. Manion, who was sitting on a removeable, folding •jump seat" placed 
beside the driver's seat, was thrown from delivery automobile when it went into the ditch and 
killed. 
Mrs. Manion sued Watson and also sued Waybright. Her action against Waybright was 
premised on a respondent superior theory based on the contention that Watson was in scope of his 
employment with Waybright when driving to Spokane at the time of the accident. Under the guest 
statute in effect in 1937, neither Watson nor Waybright would have any liability to Manion' s 
widow unless Watson was grossly negligence in his operation of the delivery automobile or had 
acted with reckless disregard of the rights and safety of Manion. The jury returned a verdict for 
Mrs. Manion against both Watson and Waybright. finding the Watson had driven the vehicle in a 
grossly negligent manner and that Watson had been engaged in the performance of the duties of 
his employment with Waybright at the time of the accident. Waybright appealed the trial court's 
denial of the motion for new trial and the order denying judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
~he Court affirmed the trial court's decision. It found that °'[t]he evidence is ample to 
justify a conclusion on the part of the jury that Watson was guilty of gross negligence and acted 
with reckless disregard of the rights and safety of Manion in driving as he did."59 Idaho at 660. 
86 P.2d at 188. It also found that there was evidence to support the jury's conclusion that Watson 
was in the scope of his employment, stating: 
Whether [Watson] went there late the night of March 17, or early the morning of 
March 18, was immaterial; that the presence and condition of Manion [intoxication] 
made the trip on the night of March 17, preferable, and caused the journey to be 
undertaken then, does not alter the fact that Watson was going to Spokane to 
supervise and assist in loading the car of vegetables, which was a duty he owed his 
employer, as was his making the trip to do it. Whether he went that night or the 
next morning was for him to decide and his going when he did was neither departure 
from, nor inconsistent with, the duties of his employment. 
59 Idaho at 656, 86 P.2d at 187. 
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The jury's determination that Watson was in the course of employment with Waybright 
whi]e driving from Coeur d'Alene to Spokane on the night of the accident was essential to the 
determination that Watson's conduct in operating the vehicle was attributab]e to Waybright for 
purposes of Waybright's liability in tort to Mrs. Manion under principles of respondeat superior. 
The Court recent]y held in Teurlings v. Larson, 156 Idaho 65, 320 P.3d 1224 (2014), that the 
workers' compensation doctrine of the going and coming rule and its exceptions does not apply to 
the law of respondeat superior. 
Teurlings brought a civil action against Martinez, a member of the Idaho National Guard, 
for injuries sustained in a vehicle collision allegedly caused by Martinez' negligence. Martinez 
moved for summary judgment asserting immunity under Idaho Code §72-6-904(4), which 
provides immunity to National Guard members for claims arising out of certain federal training or 
duty. The district court concluded that immunity applied and granted Martinez summary 
judgment. Teurlings appealed. The Court vacated the district court's judgment dismissing the 
action against Martinez and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. The 
Court concluded the district court had not applied the correct analysis under respondeat superior 
for determining the scope of employment issue for purposes of Idaho Code §6-904. The Court 
explained, in pertinent part, that: 
This Court has not previously addressed the meaning of the phrase "course and 
scope of employment" as used in I.C. § 6-904. The district court held that the special 
errand exception to the coming and going rule, traditionally applied only to 
workers' compensation cases, would apply to this case. Under the special errand 
exception, the district court found Martinez was acting within the course and scope 
of her employment under I.C. § 6-904. Teurlings asks this Court to borrow the 
coming and going rule from workers' compensation law and apply it to our analysis 
of I.C. § 6-904, but argues that the exceptions to the coming and going rule are 
inapplicable. 
Martinez argues that the coming and going rule should not be applied, but if it is 
applied then its exceptions must also be utilized. Martinez advances the special 
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errand and traveling employee exceptions, along with an "agreement" exception 
which this Court has never adopted, and asserts these exceptions establish Martinez 
was within the course and scope of her employment under J.C. § 6-904(4). 
In Idaho, course and scope of employment is discussed in two distinct areas, first, 
in tort under the theory of respondeat superior and second, in the context of the 
statutory scheme of workers' compensation. We note the distinction between the 
compensation of an employee for injuries the employee sustained while serving the 
employer and extending responsibility to an employer to compensate a third party 
for injuries caused by the negligence of an employee. As LC. § 6-904 involves 
injuries to third parties, whether an employee's actions are within the course and 
scope of employment is a question governed by Idaho's principles of respondeat 
supenor. 
We decline to extend the coming and going rule and its exceptions to the law of 
respondeat superior. The coming and going rule dictates that employees are not 
within the course and scope of employment on their way to or from work. Finhold 
v. Creso, 143 Idaho 894, 898, 155 P.3d 695, 699 (2007) (citing Ridgeway v. 
Combined Ins. Cos. of America, 98 Idaho 410,411,565 P.2d 1367, 1368 (1977)). 
However, there are various exceptions to the coming and going rule including: (1) 
the special errand; (2) the traveling employee; (3) peculiar risk, and; (4) dual 
purpose doctrine. See Freeman v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp., 135 Idaho 36, 38, 13 
P.3d 867, 869 (2000). These exceptions bring an employee's acts back within the 
scope of employment even while traveling to or from work and generally serve to 
expand the course and scope of employment. 
Our decision not to borrow this concept is based upon the different goals of 
workers' compensation and the doctrine of respondeat superior. A liberal 
interpretation of the scope of employment in workers' compensation cases is 
warranted in order to ensure certain recovery for injured workers, regardless of 
fault. See Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 342, 346, 109 P.3d 1084, 1088 
(2005). There is no such tradition of a liberal approach to course and scope 
questions when considering application of respondeat superior in order to impose 
tort liability onto an employer. Thus, "the relevant factors for determining whether 
an injury arises in the course and scope of employment for workers' compensation 
purposes are not necessarily the same factors which would determine whether an 
employee was acting within the scope of his employment for purposes of 
respondeat superior liability for injury to a third party." Slade v. Smith's Mgmt. 
Corp., 119 Idaho 482, 494, 808 P.2d 401, 413 (1991). As we do not extend the 
coming and going rule to our analysis under J.C. § 6-904, we need not address the 
various exceptions discussed by both parties. 
The proper analysis under I.C. § 6-904 turns on scope of employment as defined by 
respondeat superior. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, "an employer is 
liable in tort for the tortious conduct of an employee committed within the scope of 
employment." Finhold, 143 Idaho at 897, 155 P.3d at 698. The scope of one's 
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employment includes conduct (1) which is the kind the employee is employed to 
perform, that (2) "occurs substantially within the authorized limits of time and 
space," and (3) "is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master." 
Richard J. and Esther E. Wooley Trust v. DeBest Plumbing, Inc., 133 Idaho 180, 
184,983 P.2d 834, 838 (1999) (quoting Podolan v. Idaho Legal Aid Service, Inc., 
123 Idaho 937, 944, 854 P.2d 280, 287 (Ct. App. 1993)). This inquiry is focused 
on the service to the employer; acts done to serve the employer fall within the scope 
of employment while acts "pursued for a purely personal purpose do not." Finhold, 
143 Idaho at 897, 155 P.3d at 698 (citing Wooley Trust, 133 Idaho at 184, 983 P.2d 
at 838). We also look to whether the employer had the right to control the functions 
and duties of the agent at the time of the negligence. See Van Vranken v. Fence-
Craft, 91 Idaho 742,747,430 P.2d 488,493 (1967). 
156 Idaho at 73-4, 320 P.3d at 1232-33. 
Thus, given the distinction drawn by the Court in Teurlings between the determination of 
course and scope of employment for purposes of tort under the theory of respondent superior, and 
for purposes of workers' compensation under the going and coming rule and its exceptions, the 
decision Manion, contrary to Claimant's argument, is not controlling in the instant case. Because 
the going and coming rule and its exceptions are not relevant for purposes of respondeat superior, 
it stands to reason that respondeat superior cases are not relevant to workers' compensation. 
Consequently, the Commission did not err in failing to apply Manion. Furthermore, Manion cannot 
be legitimately cited for the proposition that an employee's use of a company vehicle at the time 
of an accident is legally sufficient by itself to constitute an exception to the going and coming rule. 
Examination of the context and facts in Hansen v. Estate of Harvey, supra, results in a 
similar fate for Claimant's argument regarding the alleged applicability of the decision. 
Hansen involved a personal injury action in Idaho by two employees against Harvey, who 
was their employer, seeking to impute to Harvey the negligence of a third employee, Harvey's son, 
who had been driving the employer-provided truck that was transporting the three employees from 
St. Maries where Harvey's roofing business was primarily located, to a job site in Spokane, 
Washington. 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF -11 
Hansen and Lehman were injured when the truck, which was being operated by Harvey's 
son James, ran off the road while in Washington on the way to Spokane. James Harvey was killed 
in the accident. The employer had workers' compensation coverage in both Idaho and 
Washington. Both Hansen and Lehman obtained workers' compensation benefits from the 
Washington Department of Labor and Industries, which awarded benefits after determining that 
their injuries arose out of and in the course of employment. After receiving their awards in 
Washington, both Hansen and Lehman brought a tort action in Idaho against their employer. The 
district court entered summary judgement for the employer on the basis that the Washington 
determination that Hansen and Lehman were injured in the course of their employment was 
entitled to preclusive effect, of the exclusive remedy provision of the Idaho Workers' 
Compensation Law barred their tort action against Harvey. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed. Hansen v. Estate of Harvey, 119 Idaho 358, 806 P.3d 450, (Idaho Ct. App. 1990). 
Hansen and Lehman then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, which also affirmed. 
The Court's essential reason for affirming was that the determination by the Washington 
Department of Labor and Industries was entitled to res judicata or collateral estoppel effect on the 
issue of whether the accident and the injuries of the plaintiffs arose while they were in the course 
of their employment with Harvey. 
In this case, the Washington Department of Labor and Industries specifically found 
that appellants had been injured within the course of their employments. Thus, 
under Thomas, Rajspic, Anderson v. Gailey, and Shoopman v. Calvor, supra, 
appellants are precluded from relitigating in this tort action the Washington 
Industrial Commission's determination that they were injured within the course of 
their employment. Under I.C. §72-211, workers' compensation is the only remedy 
available to a person injured in the course of his employment. 
119 Idaho at 337-8, 806 P.2d at430-l. The Court, however, went beyond that rationale, which was 
legally sufficient for its decision, to state the dictum that "any time an employee is injured while 
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going to or coming from work in transportation provided by his employer, he is considered to be 
within the course of employment." 119 Idaho at 338, 806 P.2d at 431. It cited Eriksen v. Nez 
Perce County, 72 Idaho 1,235 P.2d 736 (1951), which also had been used by the Court of Appeal 
in a similar way. 
The actual decision in Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, supra, however does not readily lend 
itself to the broad interpretation as stated by the majority in Hansen, supra. Eriksen was a road 
grader operator who usually drove to work in a company truck, but who sometimes would use his 
own vehicle. He had used his own vehicle to drive to work on the day of the accident. He parked 
his car and had walked a short distance to the grader when he noticed that his car was moving. He 
raced back to his car, jumped on the running board, and attempted to bring his car under 
control. The car swerved into a ditch. Eriksen was thrown to the bottom of the ditch, injuring his 
right shoulder and head. The Industrial Accident Board found for Eriksen, but the Court 
reversed. The Court analyzed the case under the doctrine that injuries which occur while an 
employee is voluntarily engaged in an activity solely for his own benefit and not in an activity 
incidental to his employment do not arise out of and in the course of employment. It reviewed 
relevant Idaho decisions, and also cited cases from numerous jurisdictions which had applied that 
rule. It concluded that the claimant's injuries arose from personal acts for his personal benefit and, 
thus, did not arise out of and in the course of employment: 
Injuries received by an employee who voluntarily engaged in some act1v1ty, 
undertaken solely for his own benefit, do not ordinarily arise out of or in the course 
of his employment especially where such activity is not an incident of his 
employment, nor has any connection or relation to such employment. 58 Am. Jur. 
Sec. 235, p. 740. 
Applying the settled law of this state to the facts, we are constrained to the 
conclusion that the injury arose out of the performance of personal acts of claimant 
for his personal benefit, which acts were foreign to and had not causal rational 
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connection with his employment and hence his injuries did not arise out of and in 
the course of his employment. 
72 Idaho at 15, 235 P.2d at 740. 
Thus, the actual holding in Erikse,z does not support the proposition for which the Court 
cited it Hansen. What the Court and the Court of Appeals in Hansen were actually focusing on, 
however, was a reference in Eriksen to an exception to the going and coming rule "where going 
or returning in some employment facility furnished by the employer[.]" See Eriksen, 72 Idaho at 
6,235 P.2d at 739, as referenced by the Court of Appeals in Hansen, 119 Idaho at 358-9, 806 P.2d 
at 451-2; and by the Court in Hansen, 119 Idaho at 338, 806 P. 2d at 431. The Court in Hansen 
explained that the quoted exception had been described in 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation 
Law, § 17.11 as follows: 
If the trip to and from work is made in a truck, bus, van, car, or other vehicle under 
the control of the employer, an injury during that trip is incurred in the course of 
employment .... The reason for the rule in this section depends upon the extension 
of risks under the employer's control. 
119 Idaho at 338, 806 P.2d at 431. The Court further noted that the rationale underlying the rule 
is that "since the employer is in control of those risks by providing the transportation, the employee 
is considered to be within the course of his employment." Id. 
What distinguishes Hansen from the instant case and renders it nonapplicable, however, is 
that neither Hansen nor Lehman were driving the vehicle in which they were passengers. As 
passengers, neither Hansen nor Lehman had control of the operation of the vehicle. That 
distinction was crucial to the Commission in its analysis that Hansen did not apply. 
However, we conclude that Hansen is inapposite to the facts before us. The 
rationale for extending the course of employment to travel to and from the work 
site in Hansen is that by providing a transportation facility to the injured worker, 
employer extended risks under the employer's control. The rationale necessarily 
depends on the fact that employer provided not only the vehicle used to accomplish 
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the journey, but also an agent of the employer to operate the same. Such facts 
explain why, after getting into the transportation business, an employer can be 
charged with the risks that attend transportation to and from work. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Dissenting Opinion, Finding 23, R., p. 24. 
D. CLAIMANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES ON 
APPEAL 
Employer and Surety have raised legitimate legal issues on appeal and have not requested 
that the Court reweigh the evidence as prohibited by Spivey v. Novartis Seed Inc., 137 Idaho 29, 
35, 43 P.3 788, 794 (2002); and Duncan v. Navajo Trucking, 134 Idaho 202, 204, 998 P.2d 1115, 
1117 (2000). Consequently, Employer's and Surety's appeal has reasonable grounds. Therefore, 
Claimant is not entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal. 
II. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments presented by Employer and Surety in their Appellants' Reply 
Brief and in their Appellant's Opening Brief, the Commission's decision should be vacated and 
remanded to the Commission for findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with this 
Court's decision and opinion. 
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